







an	  aircra8	  is	  not	  alone	  in	  the	  sky...	  
Safe	  Air	  Transporta.on	  
§  Air	  traﬃc	  opera.ons	  are	  expected	  to	  increase	  signiﬁcantly.	  
Automa.on	  must	  maintain	  or	  exceed	  current	  safety	  standards	  
§  Separa.on	  Assurance	  –	  algorithms	  and	  systems	  gradually	  taking	  the	  
role	  of	  air-­‐traﬃc	  controllers	  to	  enable	  reduced	  aircra8	  separa.on	  
§  Onboard-­‐Collision	  Avoidance	  Systems	  –	  TCAS,	  ACAS	  X	  	  




§  40	  secs	  from	  Near-­‐Mid-­‐Air	  Collision	  (NMAC)	  
§  state	  variables	  
–  hrel	  :	  rela.ve	  al.tude,	  in	  [-­‐1000…1000]	  !	  
–  dhown	  /	  dhint	  :	  ownship	  /	  intruder	  climb	  
rates,	  in	  [-­‐2500…2500]!/min	  	  
§  aprev	  /	  sRA:	  advisory	  issued	  by	  ACAS	  X	  in	  
previous	  sec	  /	  current	  pilot	  state,	  both	  in	  	  	  
{COC,	  CL/DES1500,	  SCL/SDES1500,	  SCL/SDES2500	  
§  update	  and	  advisory	  frequency	  is	  set	  to	  1	  sec	  
§  discre7za7on	  resolu7on	  n	  for	  a	  variable	  V	  
means	  that	  V	  is	  discre.zed	  to	  n	  points	  above	  
and	  n	  points	  below	  0	  within	  its	  interval	  of	  
values.	  For	  example,	  discre.za.on	  resolu.on	  
of	  10	  for	  hrel	  means:	  
	  {-­‐1000,	  -­‐900,	  -­‐800,	  …	  ,	  0,	  100,	  …,	  900,	  1000}	  
	   ownship 
intruder 
ACAS	  X	  –	  goals	  
stateA 
stateB stateC stateE 
… 
… … … 
CL 1500 ft/min COC 
P = 0.4 P = 0.6 
stateD 
… 
P = …      
§  NMAC	  (near-­‐mid-­‐air	  collision	  
§  Alert	  (from	  COC	  to	  advisory)	  
§  Strengthening	  (strengthen	  advisory)	  
§  Reversal	  (e.g.	  climb	  to	  descend)	  
§  COC	  (clear	  of	  conﬂict)	  
minimize	  costs	  /	  maximize	  rewards	  
deploying	  ACAS	  X	  as	  a	  look	  up	  table	  	  
each grid-point in the look up table has corresponding costs for each advisory; 
ACAS X returns the advisory with the smallest cost.  
simula.on	  with	  low	  NMAC	  weight	  (0.01)	  
simula.on	  with	  high	  NMAC	  weight	  (100)	  
ACAS-­‐X	  
verification starts with asking questions 
would	  you	  trust	  ACAS	  X	  in	  a	  ﬂight?	  
did they pick the right costs? 
how likely is an NMAC? 
does the model make sense? 
what if the pilot reacts late? 
ACAS-­‐X	  
...and proceeds with answering them 










DRG	   DRE	  (higher	  resolu7on	  
than	  DRG)	  
DRG	  :	  model	  discre.za.on	  resolu.on	  for	  look-­‐up	  table	  genera.on;	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  baseline	  [KC	  2011]	  resolu.on	  is	  (dhown=10,	  dhint=10,	  hrel=10)	  
DRE	  :	  model	  discre.za.on	  resolu.on	  to	  model	  check	  look-­‐up	  table	  
eﬀects	  of	  resolu.on	  DRE	  on	  model	  checking	  
	  
§  we	  	  compute	  P(NMAC)	  of	  the	  baseline	  look	  up	  table	  deployed	  in	  
models	  that	  are	  obtained	  through	  discre.za.on	  with	  varying	  
resolu.ons	  DRE	  (dhown,	  dhint,	  hrel)	  
	  
–  ALL	  varies	  climb	  rates	  and	  rela.ve	  al.tude	  in	  DRE:	  (20,	  20,	  20),	  (30,	  30,	  30),	  …	  
–  climb	  varies	  climb	  rates	  only	  in	  DRE:	  (20,	  20,	  10),	  (30,	  30,	  10),	  …	  





















§  P(NMAC)	  decreases	  with	  higher	  evalua.on	  resolu.ons	  
§  rela.ve	  al.tude	  discre.za.on	  is	  indica.ve	  
mod l checking resolution DRE 




probabilis.c	  model	  checking	  DRE	  =	  (50,	  50,	  100)	  
	  
allows	  precise	  automated	  analysis	  of	  probabilis.c	  proper.es	  
expressed	  in	  a	  formal	  logic	  such	  as	  PCTL;	  generates	  encounters	  that	  
exhibit	  property-­‐related	  behaviors	  
	  
§  what	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  NMAC?	  	  	  (P=?[F	  NMAC]) 	  2.5	  x	  10-­‐4	  
§  what	  if	  pilot	  responds	  immediately?	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (P=?(F	  NMAC	  |	  Gaprev	  =	  sRA)) 	  2.3	  x	  10-­‐8	  
	  
	  
§  what	  is	  the	  probability	  of	  a	  split	  advisory?	   	   	  1.8	  x	  10-­‐3	  
	  	  	  	  	  P=?[	  F	  (!COC	  ∧	 P=1[X	  COC]	  ∧	  P>0	  [F	  !COC]	  )]	  
§  split	  advisories	  are	  harder	  to	  directly	  take	  into	  account	  during	  look	  
up	  table	  genera.on	  because	  they	  require	  to	  record	  history	  
split	  advisory	  encounter	  




































synthesis	  /	  design	  
weights	  vs.	  performance	  
§  tune	  look-­‐up	  tables	  based	  on	  minimum	  acceptable	  performance	  
–  determinis.c	  look-­‐up	  tables	  based	  on	  weights	  form	  a	  convex	  Pareto	  front;	  we	  



























DRG	   DRE	  (higher	  resolu7on	  
than	  DRG)	  
DRG	  :	  model	  discre.za.on	  resolu.on	  for	  look-­‐up	  table	  genera.on;	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  baseline	  [KC	  2011]	  resolu.on	  is	  (dhown=10,	  dhint=10,	  hrel=10)	  
DRE	  :	  model	  discre.za.on	  resolu.on	  to	  model	  check	  look-­‐up	  table	  
Pareto	  
algorithms	  
synthesizing	  bemer	  tables	  in	  higher	  DRG	  	  
§  ques.on:	  what	  is	  the	  eﬀect	  of	  resolu.on	  discre.za.on	  DRG	  on	  look-­‐
up	  table	  synthesis?	  	  
§  experiment	  set	  up:	  
–  evaluate	  baseline	  (dhown=10,	  dhint=10,	  hrel=10)	  [KC	  2011]	  	  in	  new	  DRG	  
–  use	  result	  as	  target	  for	  synthesis	  
§  how	  we	  vary	  resolu.ons	  DRG	  (dhown,	  dhint,	  hrel)	  
–  ALL	  varies	  climb	  rates	  and	  rela.ve	  al.tude	  in	  DRG:	  (20,	  20,	  20),	  (30,	  30,	  30),	  …	  
–  climb	  varies	  climb	  rates	  only	  in	  DRG:	  (20,	  20,	  10),	  (30,	  30,	  10),	  …	  
–  alt	  varies	  rela.ve	  al.tude	  only	  in	  DRG:	  (10,	  10,	  20),	  (10,	  10,	  30),	  …	  
–  note	  that	  alt	  results	  in	  the	  smallest	  look	  up	  tables	  −	  in	  terms	  of	  numbers	  of	  
states	  −	  for	  each	  value	  increase	  
	  
§  compare	  the	  synthesized	  look-­‐up	  tables	  in	  DRE	  =	  (50,	  50,	  100)	  	  
table	  synthesis	  at	  diﬀerent	  resolu.ons	  

























§  we	  could	  not	  use	  oﬀ-­‐the-­‐shelf	  tools,	  so	  we	  built	  VeriCA	  toolset	  
-  our	  tools	  support	  models	  wrimen	  in	  Java	  	  
-  we	  customized	  veriﬁca.on	  and	  synthesis	  algorithms	  for	  ACAS	  X	  needs	  
§  we	  analyzed	  ACAS	  X	  version	  that	  we	  reproduced	  based	  on:	  	  
Kochenderfer,	  M.	  J.,	  and	  Chryssanthacopoulos,	  J.	  P.	  Robust	  airborne	  collision	  avoidance	  
through	  dynamic	  programming.	  Project	  Report	  ATC-­‐371,	  Massachusems	  Ins.tute	  of	  
Technology,	  Lincoln	  Laboratory,	  2011.	  
	  
§  ETAPS	  2014	  EASST	  best	  paper	  award	  
–  Chris.an	  von	  Essen,	  Dimitra	  Giannakopoulou:	  Analyzing	  the	  Next	  Genera+on	  
Airborne	  Collision	  Avoidance	  System,	  TACAS	  2014.	  	  
§  FAA	  /	  NASA	  Ames	  Interagency	  Agreement	  for	  ACAS	  X	  and	  VeriCA	  
–  thus	  able	  to	  apply	  our	  subsequent	  work	  on	  the	  actual	  ACAS	  X	  code	  
model	  quality	  
comparing	  model	  to	  real	  world	  
State machine model with probabilistic transitions (MDP) is used to generate onboard 
look-up table. The MDP is not present in the onboard system. 
t 
We defined Conformance Relations that compare MDP model to flight data 
state estimate at time t 
on look-up table 
comparing	  model	  to	  real	  world	  
State machine model with probabilistic transitions (MDP) is used to generate onboard 
look-up table. The MDP is not present in the onboard system. 
t 
t+1sec 
We defined Conformance Relations that compare MDP model to flight data 
state estimate at time t 
on look-up table 
state estimate at time t+1 
on look-up table 
comparing	  model	  to	  real	  world	  
State machine model with probabilistic transitions (MDP) is used to generate onboard 
look-up table. The MDP is not present in the onboard system. 
t 
t+1sec 
We defined Conformance Relations that compare MDP model to flight data 
MDP model  
state transitions 
full conformance:  
ACAS X states contained  
in MDP states 
comparing	  model	  to	  real	  world	  
State machine model with probabilistic transitions (MDP) is used to generate onboard 
look-up table. The MDP is not present in the onboard system. 
t 
t+1sec 
We defined Conformance Relations that compare MDP model to flight data 
MDP model  
state transitions 
full conformance:  
ACAS X states contained  
in MDP states 
MDP model  
state transitions 
non-conformance: 
ACAS X and MDP states 
do not intersect  
data	  genera.on	  and	  analysis	  
Data	  genera7on:	  Non-­‐conforming	  encounters	  are	  rare	  in	  test	  data	  of	  
the	  ACAS	  X	  distribu.on.	  We	  used	  a	  reinforcement	  learning	  framework	  
to	  target	  genera.on	  of	  non-­‐conforming	  simulated	  encounters.	  
	  	  	  
Data	  Analysis:	  The	  intruder	  climb	  
rate	  has	  been	  iden.ﬁed	  as	  a	  
common	  factor	  for	  divergence	  
across	  the	  data.	  Further	  analysis	  is	  
needed.	  
Open	  ques7on:	  Does	  non-­‐
conformance	  imply	  poten.al	  





§  formula.on	  of	  requirements	  is	  harder	  –	  autonomy-­‐speciﬁc?	  
–  op.miza.on,	  adap.ve	  and	  learning	  	  algorithms	  
–  example:	  loss	  of	  separa.on,	  ACAS	  X	  	  
	  
V&V	  of	  autonomy	  
generate	  strategic	  secondary	  aircra8	  







§  formula.on	  of	  requirements	  is	  harder	  –	  autonomy-­‐speciﬁc?	  
–  op.miza.on,	  adap.ve	  and	  learning	  	  algorithms	  
–  example:	  separa.on	  assurance,	  ACAS	  X	  	  
§  need	  for	  advanced	  tes.ng	  infrastructures	  
–  test	  case	  genera.on	  for	  stress-­‐tes.ng	  and	  requirements	  coverage	  
–  examples:	  ACAS	  X,	  separa.on	  assurance,	  autonomous	  vehicles	  
	  
§  V&V	  at	  run.me,	  including	  requirements	  
–  ACAS	  X	  (error	  predic.on	  with	  sta.s.cal	  learning)	  
–  separa.on	  assurance	  
§  trust	  
–  extensive	  veriﬁca.on	  
–  explana.on	  of	  decision-­‐making	  algorithms	  
V&V	  of	  autonomy	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